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mayor nivel educativo, los hombres, los residentes en la capital y los
jefes de hogar. De acuerdo con cinco medidas de la brecha promedio
para los asalariados y diferentes sub-muestras, se encuentra que las
remuneraciones son mayores para los trabajadores formales que para
los informales.
Abstract: In this paper we deﬁne an informal worker as one who is not contribut-
ing to the social security system. We analyze the likelihood of being an
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1. Introduction
In most Latin American countries, the social security system relies
on obligatory contributions to smooth income and consumption over
the life cycle and particularly, to prevent poverty among the elderly.
Additionally, they oﬀer beneﬁts to workers. Thus, the low level of
social security coverage among active workers has traditionally been
a cause of concern for many policy makers, who interpret it as an
indicator of lack of social protection. In recent years, interest in
coverage has increased partly because of the implementation of so-
cial security reforms whose future success requires a certain number
of workers with coverage. Indeed, several Latin American countries
including Uruguay sought to tighten the link between personal con-
tributions and beneﬁts, and to reduce the level of evasion of adminis-
tration controls. However, coverage tended to decrase from the early
1990s to mid-2000s (Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean, 2006).
Following the deﬁnition that identiﬁes informal workers as those
for whom labor regulations are not applied (Portes, Castells and Ben-
ton, 1989), we will denote non-covered workers as informal.1
A strand of the literature traces the causes of the persistence of
informality in the restrictions faced by workers who are unable to ﬁnd
a job in the formal sector. It also has been argued that at least part
of the increase in informality in Latin America has stemmed from
large modern enterprises that avoid labor regulation costs by sub-
contracting unprotected workers. Thus, informal workers would have
worse working conditions and receive lower pay than formal workers.
An alternative approach is to see informality as a choice made by
workers and ﬁrms for whom the formal sector is not attractive be-
cause of the cost of complying with regulations. People may choose
informality because the beneﬁts of regulation are not well targeted,
or because of workers myopia or as a transitory state, i.e. as an entry
point to a permanent job. Thus, we would expect a wage diﬀeren-
tial stemming from the tax-evasion, in other words, informal workers
would be overpaid. Recently, Perry et al. (2007) studied the causes
and consequences of informality in Latin America and conclude that
both “exclusion” and “exit” contribute to explaining Latin-American
informality.2
1 We do not use the deﬁntion whereby informality is identiﬁed on the basis of
unit size and that one of the characteristics of this size is a link to non-compliance
with labor regulations (Tokman, 1990).
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By Latin-American standards, Uruguay boasts a long tradition
of social security programs, with high coverage among the elderly
and more generally, an extended public beneﬁts system. Since the
mid 1950s, quality of public beneﬁts and their ﬁnancial situation has
tended to worsen. During the 1990s, the sustainability of Uruguays
social security system sustainability was seriously compromised. Like
in other countries, a social security reform was introduced, contribu-
tions were increased, ,beneﬁts were reduced, and levels of enforcement
and requirements (in terms of periods of formal work) for access to
pensions were strenghtened. In addition, the long-term trend of re-
ducing beneﬁts for non-contributors continued. However, levels of
non-contribution increased, particularly during the severe downturn
in economic activity in 1999-2002. In 2005, two years after the eco-
nomic recovery began, informal workers accounted for around 38% of
employment and 23% of salaried work. The apparent persistence of
informality in the context of a reform that tended to discourage the
“exit” causes, in a country with one of the lowest informality levels
in Latin America, makes Uruguay an interesting case.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the proﬁle of formal
and informal workers and their wage diﬀerential in Uruguay country,
using cross-section information from a household survey. This sur-
vey inquires whether or not workers contribute to the social security
system. Although contributions are compulsory for the whole labor
force, informality is not socially strongly disapproved so the informa-
tion collected can be considered reliable. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. In the ﬁrst section we give a brief description
of the social security system. In the second section we present the
characteristics of the data and the methodology. In the third section
we present the results, including a description of the main data, an
estimation of the likelihood of being informal, and the earnings gap
between sectors, using the whole sample of salaried workers and sub-
samples by industry. In the fourth section we discuss our results and
lastly, we present our conclusions.
2. Institutional background
In Uruguay, the social security system was set up at the end of the
19th century on the basis of occupation-speciﬁc contributory pro-
restrictionssuch as taxes and regulationsthat they would face in the formal sector.
“Exit” refers to the decision to remain in the informal sector that results from a
costbeneﬁt analysis of the advantages of both sectors.284 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
grams that oﬀered retirement pensions in a pay-as-you-go ﬁnancial
regime. Since then, the social security system has incorporated new
programs covering other risks, and has gradually been extended to
the whole of the workforce. Today, the system covers the risk of
retirement, death, unemployment, maternity, sickness and medical
beneﬁts. Most of the programs are administered by a public institu-
tion and very few occupations have their own administration (police
and armed forces personnel, ﬁnancial services employees and self-
employed university graduates are the exceptions). The general rules
are similar for the whole labor force, though beneﬁts are more gener-
ous for ﬁnancial services employees.
Since 1996, the pension system has combined a pay-as-you go pil-
lar and an individual account pillar. Workers below a certain thresh-
old contribute only to the pay-as-you-go regime unless they explicitly
choose to deposit half of their contributions in the individual account
pillar. Workers with higher income must contribute to the pay-as-
you-go pillar up to the threshold and save in an individual account
for the amount above that threshold, up to a ceiling. Above this
ceiling, contributions to the individual account pillar are voluntary.
The personal contribution rate is 18% and the employers con-
tribution rate is 17.5%. The rates are somewhat higher for public
servants. However, there are several exemptions. Speciﬁcally, manu-
facturing and transport are exempted from employers contributions.
When an individual does not contribute, we may infer that other
labor costs are also avoided. Besides contributions, labor costs include
compulsory insurance to cover work injury risk, and two taxes that
range from 0.25% to 7.25%. On the other hand, informality means
that the individual does not enjoy the beneﬁts of the contributory
systems. However, there are assistance programs that provide beneﬁts
for non-contributors. A review of these beneﬁts suggests that the
additional beneﬁts of contributory programs might not be attractive
enough, at least for some workers.
There are public institutions that provide free health care for
the poor –i.e. medical services, medicines, hospitalization, etc. As
people entitled to contributory medical beneﬁts still have to make a
payment when demanding health care, the contributory program is
more onerous than public services. In any case, two features limit
the use of public services: the fact that they involve a means test,
and the widespread perception that they are of poorer quality than
services in the private sector.
In addition, there is a family allowances program whereby in-
formal workers with children receive a payment when the householdsINFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 285
income is below a threshold. Its impact on poverty and income distri-
bution is very limited because both the transfer and the threshold are
low (Vigorito, 2005). There is also an assistance program for poor,
non-active elderly persons who are not receiving a pension from the
contributory program. This assistance program has always provided
lower beneﬁts than the contributory program; indeed, in 2005, the
average assistance pension was 42% of the average contributory pen-
sion.
Finally, the most widely-quoted disincentive to contributing to
the social security system is the weakness of eligibility requirement
controls for pension access. Until 1996, there was no registration of
individual contributions. This lack of administrative records meant
that witness testimony concerning an individuals contribution history
had to be allowed. There is a general perception that this procedure
resulted in retirements that did not comply with the minimum of
required years of contribution (Camacho, 1997; Rius, 2003). We may
speculate that this situation undermined incentives to joining the
formal sector.
In 1996, when the individual account pillar was introduced, a
labor history register was set up. At the time, there was a belief that
the introduction of an individual account pillar and the stringency
of the enforcement system based on the labor history register- would
work together to reduce informality. However, non-contribution in-
creased, particularly in 1999-2002 when the labor market was aﬀected
by a severe downturn in economic activity. In 2005, two years after
the economic recovery began, informality continued to account for
around 38% of total employment and for 23% of salaried work.
3. Data and method of estimation
Let wj be the earnings of worker j, xj his observable characteristics,
f and i two sub-indexes that denote formality and informality. We
specify the following relationship:
lnwi,j = αixi,j + vi,j (1)
lnwf,j = αf xf,j + vf,j (2)
If we assume that the disturbances v (which summarize the ef-
fects of non-observable variables) have a zero mean and are not corre-
lated with observable variables, then the coeﬃcients can be estimated286 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
by OLS. Denoting the mean of the variables with a bar and making
some calculations, we can disaggregate the raw earnings gap between
sectors as the sum of two components, as proposed by Oaxaca (1973):
(lnwf − lnwi) = (xf − xi)
0
ˆ αf + x
0
i (ˆ αf − ˆ αi) (3)
The ﬁrst term on the right is the diﬀerence among the mean
values of the independent variables for the formal and informal sec-
tor, and the second is the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of the earnings
equations. This last term –the diﬀerence not explained by indepen-
dent variables– may be interpreted as the earnings gap computed in
the mean of the characteristics.
The decomposition speciﬁed in (3) is based on returns in the in-
formal sector and the diﬀerence between coeﬃcients is weighted by
the average characteristics of informal workers. However, structure
rewards (i.e. salaries) may be weighted by another stock of endow-
ments, such as, for example, those of formal workers, as speciﬁed in
equation (4)
(lnwf − lnwi) = (xf − xi)
0
rˆ αi + x
0
f(ˆ αf − ˆ αi) (4)




i(ˆ αf − ˆ αi) (5)
G2 = x
0
f(ˆ αf − ˆ αi) (6)
These estimations have the disadvantage of ignoring the endo-
geneity of the selection decision to be formal or informal. Suppose
that an individual chooses to be formal or informal in accordance
with his expected earnings in the two sectors. And suppose also that
unobserved individual characteristics increase both earnings and the
likelihood of choosing informality. For example, people with easy
access to informal networks could enjoy greater potential gains by
being informal. In this case observed income in the informal sector
will be higher than expected income for the whole population, and
the formal-informal gap estimated by OLS will be biased.INFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 287
There are diﬀerent strategies to deal with this problem. We
choose to estimate an endogenous switching regression model (Mad-
dala, 1986) which means jointly estimating the selection rule that
sorts workers between sectors and the earnings equation of each sec-
tor.
A latent variable I∗ deﬁnes a variable I that takes the value 1
when the worker is informal and 0 when he is formal. The variable
I∗ depends on two diﬀerent types of characteristics: those that aﬀect
the level of earnings and hence the choice of being formal or informal,
and those that have a direct eﬀect on this choice. By Z we denote
the vector of both types of characteristics (which contains vector x),
and the earnings-generating model may be described by:
I∗
j = γzj + uj (7)
Ij = 1 if I∗
j > 0; Ij = 0 otherwise (8)
lnwf,j = βfxf,j + εf,j if I = 0 (9)
lnwi,j = βixi,j + εi,j if I = 1 (10)
The disturbances u are potentially correlated with εi and εf. We
















To the extent that in the selection model the parameters are
identiﬁed up to scale, we normalize the variance of disturbances in
(7) to 1 and we perform a joint estimation using the full-information
maximum likelihood method (FIML). Note that endogenous switch-
ing may be ﬁtted in two steps. When proceeding in two steps, the
estimation requires potentially cumbersome adjustments to obtain
consistent standard errors. Thus, in this paper we use the FIML to ﬁt288 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
binary and continuous parts simultaneously in order to yield consis-
tent standard errors.
Hence we obtain estimations of the coeﬃcients, the standard de-
viation of the disturbances of the selection equation (σu) and of the
wage equations (σi and σf), the correlation coeﬃcient between u and
εi (ρi = σiu/σiσu), and ﬁnally, the correlation coeﬃcient between u
and εf(ρf = σfu/σfσu).
A positive value of ρi may be interpreted as unobserved at-
tributes that lead workers to informality by pushing the earnings in
this sector up. For example, a high uj of an informal self-employed
person may be based on social networks that insure him against risks.
At the same time, social networks may increase the informal self-
employed persons number of clients, thus pushing up his earnings.
Pisani and Pagan (2004) use this estimation in order to test whether
the informal sector attracts the least able workers. A positive value
would indicate that this hypothesis may be rejected. Indeed, a pos-
itive ρi implies that informal workers on average overstate what a
randomly chosen worker could expect to earn when working in infor-
mality. Notice that ρf is an indicator of positive or negative selection
in the formal sector.
We denote the density and cumulative function of a normal dis-
tribution by φ and Φ. These estimations allow us to predict the
expected earnings in the informal sector conditional upon observing












uj > − γzj ; xi,j
￿
(11)
= βixi,j + σiρi
φ(γzj)
Φ (γzj)
Notice that a positive ρi adds a plus to unconditional expected
earnings in informality (βixi), as would be expected if this sector
attracts the most able workers (given observed skills).
We can also estimate the expected earnings that a worker ob-
served in the informal sector would receive in a formal job (equation
12). A positive ρf indicates that the expected earnings, given the












uj > − γzj ; xi,j
￿
(12)
= βf xi,j + σf ρf
φ(γzj)
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Therefore we can estimate another proxy of the formal-informal
gap as the average diﬀerence between equations 12 and 11 among
informal workers. We denote the number of informal workers as ni,












The gap G3 is the diﬀerence between the earnings that an “av-
erage” informal worker would have received in the formal sector and
his expected earnings in the informal sector. It will be higher or
lower than the non-conditional expected wage in accordance with the
absolute values of the selection terms in (11) and (12).
A fourth proxy of the earnings gap is a calculation of the diﬀer-
ence between the earnings of an “average” formal worker and those
he would have received in the informal sector, both conditional on













uj < − γzj ; xf,j
￿
(14)
= βf xf,j − σf ρf
φ(γzj)













uj < − γzj ; xf,j
￿
(15)
= βixf,j + σiρi
φ(γzj)
1 − Φ (γzj)
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Finally, the gap may be estimated as the diﬀerence between ex-
pected earnings in the formal sector conditional on being selected as
formal, and expected earnings in the informal sector conditional on
the worker being selected as informal. Both terms are valued on the
average characteristics of all workers. The gap thus deﬁned (G5) is















In order to ﬁt the earnings-generating models described above,
we use the Continuous Household Survey, —Encuesta continua de
hogares (ECH)— conducted by the National Statistics Institute –
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica (INE), in 2005. The ECH is a survey
carried out in urban areas. As more than 90% of the Uruguayan
population is urban, the survey gives a good representation of the
country.
The data set comes from a stratiﬁed sample. Stratiﬁcation could
generate correlation within the stratum. Therefore, following Wool-
dridge (2002) we compute cluster-robust standard errors, that is, ob-
servations are considered independent across strata but not necessar-
ily within them. We restrict the sample to 18-to-59-year-old workers
who declared themselves to be salaried workers at the time of the
interview. Thus, we exclude unpaid family members, domestic work-
ers living in the house where they work, enterprise owners and the
self-employed. We perform the estimations for the whole sample of
salaried workers and for sub-samples of the private sector by industry.
The survey inquires into individual endowments (age, sex, mari-
tal status, schooling), labor characteristics (hours of work, industry)
and income received in the preceding month, classiﬁed by source.
Besides this, the survey reports whether or not the individual con-
tributes to the social security system. When an individual has more
than one job, we consider the characteristics of the main one that is,
the job that accounts for the highest earnings. Wages are calculated
as the sum of in-cash and in-kind labor income, including the in-cash
regular wage, tips and bonuses. In addition, we estimate the amount
of three labor beneﬁts: medical beneﬁts, a (compulsory) thirteenth
monthly wage (the survey inquires into the eﬀective payment of this)
and the so-called “vacation pay”, which is an amount that is paid
when workers have their annual holiday –imputed to private salariedINFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 291
workers who actually receive the thirteenth wage. We calculated the
log hourly wage using the information reported about hours of work.
Note that earnings are those received the preceding month but hours
or type of work are those of the preceding week.
4. Results
4.1. Data description
As can be seen in table 1, in 2005 around of 23% of workers aged 18-to-
59 are informal. Comparisons between sectors suggest that informal
workers tend to be young and less-educated. Indeed, the average age
is 38.7 in the formal sector and 34.6 in the informal sector, and the
median values are 39 and 33, respectively. Many young people study
and do part-time work at the same time, so working in the informal
sector at this life-cycle stage is often seen as a desirable personal sit-
uation. The average years of schooling are 11.2 and 8.7 in the formal
and informal sector, respectively. It is worth noting that informality
is quite widespread among young students with incomplete tertiary
studies who work, and this pushes up the education level of informal
workers.
At the beginning of the 1990s informality was higher among
women than men and that the gender gap steadily narrowed dur-
ing that decade (Bucheli, 2004). The ﬁgures in table 1 show that in
2005 the rate of informality was higher among men than women.
As expected, most public servants contribute to the social secu-
rity system. The few public-sector workers who are not in the formal
sector may be explained by the lack of controls on private ﬁrms sub-
contracted by the public sector. Indeed, subcontracting has been an
increasing mechanism that the public sector has been using to reduce
the size of its work force. In addition, ﬁrm size appears to be closely
correlated with formality. Employees in private ﬁrms with more than
10 employees account for 47% of salaried workers in the formal sector
but only for 17% in the informal sector. On the other hand, the ﬁgures
for ﬁrms with less than 5 employees are 12% and 65%, respectively.
As regards industrial classiﬁcation, workers in the building in-
dustry, and trade, restaurants and hotels are overrepresented in the
informal sector. At the other end of the scale, workers in the ﬁnance,
electricity, gas and water sectors, which are activities with a rela-
tively low weight in employment, are overrepresented in the formal
sector. Note also that public enterprises are the main suppliers of
these services.292 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Table 1
Summary statistics by category
Full sample Formal sector Informal sector
Mean Std Medi- Mean Std Medi- Mean Std Medi-
Dev. an Dev. an Dev. an-
Informal .227 .419 0 .000 .000 0 1.000 .000 1
Log hourly earnings 3.641 .788 3.635 3.830 .707 3.791 2.998 .706 2.974
Age 37.8 11.350 38 38.7 11.023 39 34.6 11.871 33
Schooling 1.6 3.781 10 11.2 3.772 11 8.7 3.083 8
Female .480 .500 0 .468 .499 0 .523 .500 1
Capital city .574 .494 1 .612 .487 1 .445 .497 0
Employment type and ﬁrm size
Public servants .241 .428 0 .308 .462 0 .014 .116 0
Private firms .759 .428 1 .692 .462 1 .986 .116 1
Less than 5 employ. .242 .428 0 .120 .325 0 .655 .476 1
From 5 to 9 employ. .112 .316 0 .099 .298 0 .158 .364 0
10 or more employ. .405 .491 0 .473 .499 0 .174 .379 0
Industry
Agriculture .036 .186 0 .030 .171 0 .056 .231 0
and mining
Manufacturing .146 .353 0 .145 .353 0 .146 .353 0
Electricity, .013 .113 0 .017 .128 0 .000 .018 0
gas and water
Building .050 .218 0 .042 .201 0 .077 .267 0
Trade, restau- .192 .394 0 .185 .388 0 .216 .412 0
rants and hotels
Transport and .066 .248 0 .073 .260 0 .043 .202 0
communications
Finance .028 .165 0 .035 .185 0 .003 .051 0
Personal and com- .467 .499 0 .471 .499 0 .456 .498 0
munity services
Source: Encuesta continua de hogares, (2005), INE.
4.2. Determinants of participation in informality
The estimated coeﬃcients of the equation for the switching regression
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variables included in the earning function and variables that inﬂuence
the choice of the sector but not the individual wage. The former in-
clude years of schooling; potential experience (age - years of schooling
6) and squared potential experience; a gender dummy that takes the
value 1 when the worker is a woman; a regional dummy that takes the
value 1 for the capital city and 21 dummies that distinguish diﬀerent
industries.
The likelihood of working in the informal sector decreases with
years of schooling, is lower for people who do not live in the capital
city, and is higher for women than for men. We report the estimated
coeﬃcients of sectors in Annex 1. The sectors where informality is
most likely are printing and furniture, building, wood and paper, and
personal services. On the other hand, workers in electricity, gas and
water, education, the ﬁnancial system and health are the most likely
to be in a formal situation.
As regards the characteristics that have a direct eﬀect on selec-
tion and do not have an indirect eﬀect through the level of earnings,
we include: a set of dummies that capture position in the house-
hold (head, spouse, son/daughter, other relationship with the head
–omitted–); a dummy variable that indicates cohabitation (legally
married or not), a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the
worker is receiving a pension; and an index of household overcrowding
(household size/number of dorms) as a proxy of wealth. Identiﬁca-
tion of the system of equations we want to estimate depends on the
accuracy of these instruments. We perform a Wald test in order
to evaluate the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in the selection
equation. We reject the null hypothesis that jointly they are equal to
zero.
Formality is more common for married workers, and it also de-
pends on the position in the household. Heads of households are the
most likely to be in the formal sector and spouses are the most likely
to be in the informal sector.
The likelihood of working in the informal sector is greater for
workers receiving a pension. Note that, with few exceptions, people
who have a pension are forbidden to work, and that it is possible to
avoid this regulation by having an informal job.
Lastly we ﬁnd a negative sign for the eﬀect of household over-
crowding. As this variable is negatively correlated with wealth, we
may infer that the poor obtain more beneﬁts through being formal.
Note that poverty is inversely related to both good health and sta-
ble work, and a lack of wealth means scant or null savings. Hence,
the unemployment and sickness beneﬁts (only oﬀered by contribu-294 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
tory social programs) that diminish the eﬀect of the lost wage are
more important for the poor. In addition, overcrowding is positively
correlated with the number of children. So it is possible that the con-
tributory family allowances program plays some role as an incentive
to contribute to the social security system.
Table 2



























Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%;
**signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%. The estimation also includes a regional
dummy and 21 industry dummies; the omitted category is agriculture.INFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 295
4.3. Earnings diﬀerential
We estimate three wage equations by OLS: one for formal workers, one
for informal workers and another for the whole sample. In addition,
we estimate wage equations for formal and for informal workers in
line with the switching regression model. As mentioned above, the
explanatory variables are years of schooling, potential experience and
its square, and the above-mentioned set of dummies that capture
gender, region and industry. The OLS estimation for the whole sample
of workers also includes a dummy that indicates informality.
We report the results of all these estimations in table 3. For all
the estimations, we obtain the expected coeﬃcient signs of the human
capital variables, although the statistical signiﬁcance varies. Earnings
increase with experience at a decreasing rate, and rise with school-
ing. Both the OLS estimations and the switching regression model
indicate that the returns to schooling and experience are greater in
the formal sector than in the informal sector. Moreover, when using
the switching regression model we cannot reject the hypothesis that
experience does not aﬀect earnings in informality.
In addition, as expected, earnings are higher for men and people
residing in the capital city. The gap due to gender is greater in the
informal sector. Furthermore, when using the switching regression
model, the estimated coeﬃcient of the female dummy is not diﬀerent
from 0 (at the usual standard statistical levels) for informal workers.
Although the coeﬃcient signs are stable, the coeﬃcient magni-
tudes diﬀer depending on whether or not we use the selection pro-
cedure. Speciﬁcally, the returns to schooling and the gender gap are
lower in the switching regression model for both sectors. Addition-
ally, the diﬀerence in these coeﬃcients between sectors is higher when
using the selection procedure.
Table 3
Wage equation estimates
OLS estimates wage equation Switching regression
without selection correction wage equations
All Formal Informal Formal Informal
Informal -0.489***
(0.019)
Schooling 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.036*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020)296 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Table 3
(continued)
OLS estimates wage equation Switching regression
without selection correction wage equations
All Formal Informal Formal Informal
Experience 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012)
Experience - 0.029*** -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.006
(squared) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016)
Female -0.154*** -0.159*** -0.139*** -0.101*** -0.040
(0.015) (0.014) (0.031) (0.024) (0.069)
Capital 0.182*** 0.145*** 0.298*** 0.116*** 0.240***
city (0.029) (0.027) (0.055) (0.026) (0.054)
Constant 2.134*** 2.139*** 1.766*** 2.626*** 1.820***
(0.077) (0.086) (0.068) (0.118) (0.074)
Observations 14 465 11 184 3 281





Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%;
**signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%. The estimation also includes a re-
gional dummy and 21 industry dummies; the omitted category is agriculture. The
switching regression is performed by a joint estimation using the full-information
maximum likelihood method.
In table 4 we present the results of the diﬀerent estimates of the
formal-informal gap. The estimated gaps based on the OLS procedure
indicate that earnings are lower in the informal sector. Similar con-
clusions can be drawn from estimations provided by Amarante (2002),
who estimates the earnings gap for 1991-2000 following Oaxaca’s pro-
posal. With our data, the raw gap is 0.83 and the proxies resulting
from the Oaxaca decomposition are 0.48 (G1) and 0.49 (G2). Notice
that the ﬁgure obtained by weighting the diﬀerence of parameters
by the average characteristics of informal workers is quite similar to
the one calculated with the average characteristics of formal workers.
Thus, in both cases, working in the informal sector is less rewarded
and the non-explained diﬀerence is about 58% of the raw average gap.INFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 297
Table 4
Gap in wage earnings between formal and informal workers:
diﬀerent measures of the mean gap and its components
Average predictedearnings Average selectionterm Mean Gap
Formal Informal Formal Informal























Notes: 1/ Weighted by the average characteristics of the informal-sector
workers; 2/ Weighted by the average characteristics of the formal-sector workers;
3/ Weighted by the average characteristics of the whole sample.
However, G1 and G2 may be biased if the peculiarities that deter-
mine wages are those that drive workers to each sector. The selection
bias may be due to individual preferences or to the rationing in the
formal sector. There is no consensus about how workers sort them-
selves or are sorted between sectors. As explained in section 2, we
choose to introduce a selection rule through modeling a switching re-
gression speciﬁcation and we calculate three additional proxies of the
gap. Estimated gaps and their components are also given in table 4.
Let us ﬁrst analyze the correlation coeﬃcient between the error
terms in the selection equation and the disturbances in each wage
equation (ρi and ρf). Both correlation coeﬃcients are positive and
signiﬁcant. A positive ρi means a positive selection into the informal
sector (equation (11)). That is, observed informal sector workers
derive a comparative advantage from working in informality and so
they are more successful than a worker drawn from a random sample.
The prediction of informal earnings which stems from a non-selection
procedure estimation overestimates the expected informal earnings
of a random worker. Analogous reasoning applies to a positive ρf.3
3 This result may be surprisingbecauseone would expectthat highly rewarded
workers in the formal sector selectthemselvesas formal. A similar result was found
by Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla and Woodruﬀ (1997) for Mexican men, but they
did not ﬁnd it for Mexican women or for workers in the other Latin American
countries studied (El Salvador and Peru).298 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Thus, the positive ρi indicates that informal workers are not drawn
from the lowest part of the informal earnings disturbance distribution.
Besides, as ρf is positive, we may infer that formal sector workers
are not drawn from the highest part of the formal distribution. In
other words, actual informal-sector workers have an advantage in the
sense that they perform above average independently of whether or
not they contribute to the social security system. Conversely, actual
formal workers have a below-average performance whether they are
sorted into the formal or the informal sector.
In columns (C) and (D) in table 4, we report the average selec-
tion terms involved in the estimation of the gaps obtained after the
switching regression model. The estimated gap G3 measures the dif-
ference between the predicted earnings in the formal sector and in the
informal sector, conditional on informality. The selection terms signs
are driven by the correlation coeﬃcient signs, as stated in equations
11 and 12, that is, they are positive. As their magnitudes are similar,
the diﬀerence between the selection terms is close to zero. We obtain
an estimated gap G3 equal to 1.16.
The proxy G4 is the gap conditional on being formal. As formal
sector workers do better in informality, the selection term of con-
ditional average predicted earnings in the formal sector is negative
(column (C)). Analytically, it is the result of a positive ρf in equa-
tion (14). On the other hand, the selection term of the conditional
average predicted earnings in the informal sector is positive (column
(D)). The diﬀerence between the selection terms is negative but the
mean gap G4 is positive (close to 1).
Lastly, G5, the diﬀerence between earnings in the formal and
informal sectors, conditioned on being selected in the sector where
the worker is observed, is 0.46.
4.4. Estimations for sub-samples of salaried workers
We performed similar estimations for diﬀerent sub-samples. Speciﬁ-
cally, we choose the group of private sector salaried workers because
of the extent of formality among public servants, whereas informal-
ity is an actual option in private sector. Additionally, we estimate
the wage gap for several industries. These estimations allow us to
compare patterns of the proﬁle of contributors and the wage gaps.
Informality accounts for 29% of private sector salaried work, that
is, somewhat more than salaried work as a whole (23%). The infor-
mality share varies among private industries. We do not performINFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 299
estimations for ﬁnancial services activities because of its low infor-
mality rate (0.3%). Notice that this economic activity is ruled by
modern and foreign enterprises, and their workers have their own se-
curity administration. As regards the selected samples, the share of
informality is lower than the average rate in the private transport,
storage and communications sector (18%); it is similar to the average
in the private manufacturing sector (23%) and in the trade, restau-
rants and hotels sector (26%) and lastly, it is higher than the average
in the private building sector (37%) and in the personal and commu-
nity services sector (40%).
Table 5 shows the main results. Most of the signs of the selec-
tion equation coeﬃcients are the same as those obtained with the full
sample, at least when signiﬁcant at the usual statistical levels. House-
hold characteristics indicate that household heads are more likely to
be in the formal sector than other members of the household, and the
probability of being formal increases with overcrowding. In addition,
being married, having a pension and living in the capital city reduce
the households probability of informality. Lastly, formality increases
with education and experience. The repeated patterns suggest that
individual decisions or rationing in the labor market aﬀect groups
with the same characteristics, whatever the economic activity.
In contrast to the above-mentioned similar patterns, the sign
of the female dummy variable is negative for the full private-sector
wage earners sample and for most of the industries. In fact, the gender
coeﬃcient is non signiﬁcant only for personal and community services,
which is the most female intensive industry (79% of its employment).
Like in the result obtained with the full sample, the correlation
coeﬃcient between the selection equation and wage equation distur-
bances are positive in the private sample and the ﬁve industry sub-
samples. The only exception is that ρi is not statistically diﬀerent
from 0 at standard levels for salaried workers in the private trans-
port, storage and communication sector, which suggests a random
selection in informality.
Table 5 also shows the estimated gaps. For all the sub-samples,
G1 and G2 are positive, and once again, the estimations obtained
when using the switching regression model indicate that these positive
values do not depend on formal/informal selection.
5. Discussion
In Uruguay, as in several other Latin American countries, in the mid
1990s a re-design of the social security system tightened the relation-300 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
ship between contributions and beneﬁts. Moreover, the institutional
background description suggests that in 2005, assistance beneﬁts were
considerably lower than contributory beneﬁts and in addition, the
administration had improved its eﬀectiveness in preventing informal
workers from accessing contributory beneﬁts. The success of these
changes in providing support for the elderly in the future relied on
the decline in informal work. There is a cause for concern today
because the level of informality is quite similar to the level in the
years prior to the reform, which would lead one to expect social pres-
sure to extend (or even create) assistance programs. As supportive
welfare systems are often quoted as a cause of informality,4 the way
this tension is tackled becomes an important challenge. In fact, today
the government is pursuing three strategies: re-strengthening enforce-
ment, relaxing the access requirements for pensions and increasing
beneﬁts for formal workers. Once again, the success of these policies
requires that many workers adapt to new conditions.
Table 5
Estimated results for salaried workers in private sector by industry
All Manu- Build- Trade, Trans- Perso-
Variable private facture ing restau- port and nal and
rant and communi- comunity
hotels cations services
Selection
House- -.179** -.207* -.055 -.208* .200 -.233*
hold head (.078) (.109) (.133) (.113) (.244) (.131)
Spouse .033 .092 .223 -.004 .518** -.101
(.078) (.129) (.382) (.116) (.239) (.139)
Son/ .055 .109 .189 -.031 .300* .007
Daughter (.039) (.089) (.410) (.076) (.176) (.080)
Married -.346*** -.302*** -.455* -.365*** -.717*** -.306***
(.046) (.062) (.459) (.060) (.142) (.097)
Pension .235*** .309** .467*** .168 -.097 .209**
(.070) (.128) (.179) (.152) (.342) (.085)
4 For a review of the causes of informal sector, see Schneiderand Enste (2000),
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Table 5
(continued)
All Manu- Build- Trade, Trans- Perso-
Variable private facture ing restau- port and nal and
rant and communi- comunity
hotels cations services
Household -.227*** -.232** -.216 -.308*** -.332** -.164***
overcrowding (.038) (.092) (.230) (.067) (.155) (.060)
Years of -.092*** -.099*** -.070** -.112*** -.113*** -.084***
schooling (.005) (.007) (.028) (.009) (.021) (.010)
Experience -.019*** -.039*** -.013 -.016 -.039** -.020
(.006) (.009) (.041) (.010) (.017) (.012)
Experience .019 .058*** .015 .017 .043 .020
(squared) (.015) (.022) (.065) (.023) (.033) (.027)
Female -.033 .011 -1.310*** -.285*** -.521** .429***
(.036) (.100) (1.624) (.077) (.232) (.074)
Capital -.250*** -.304*** -.210** -.423*** -.184 -.129*
city (.050) (.092) (.103) (.052) (.138) (.068)
Constant 1.137*** 1.674*** 1.052*** 1.713*** 1.870*** .306
(.121) (.248) (.372) (.112) (.366) (.190)
Observations 10 974 1 947 641 2 600 748 3 405
ρi .618 .332 .508 .652 .120 .671
ρf .766 .828 .948 .597 .939 .592
Raw gap .723 .813 .743 .638 .749 .774
G1 .435 .546 .645 .428 .582 .354
G2 .515 .650 .623 .442 .496 .461
G3 1.267 1.403 1.811 1.199 1.740 .960
G4 .931 .853 .725 .796 .569 .909
G5 .458 .605 .563 .410 .471 .383
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%;
**signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%. Each estimation also includes sub-
industry dummies.
Knowledge of the scope for both the “escape” and “exit” infor-
mality interpretations helps us to analyze the role that we may expect
from the social security policies. However, it is worth noting that not
only may both causes be present at the same time, but they also302 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
reinforce each other. Indeed, since workers need a certain period of
stability in the formal sector in order to reach the minimum required
history of contributions to be able to access a pension, if a worker is
“pushed” into informality in a downturn, the incentives to return to
formality decrease with time. Thus, an “escape” cause could become
an “exit” cause, which could help to explain the apparent persistence
of informality in countries subject to periodic crises.
We ﬁnd patterns of informality that are similar to those in other
studies for Latin America. Like Auerbach, Genoni and Pag´ es, (2005),
we ﬁnd a greater likelihood of informality for the young, for women
and for less-educated salaried workers. Auerbach, Genoni and Pag´ es,
interpret their results within the “exit” approach. In turn, Pisani
and Pagan (2004) –although deﬁning informality on the basis of unit
size, which is highly correlated to non-contribution- ﬁnd that low
education and being female were the maindeterminants of informality
in Nicaragua. They ﬁnd a positive selectivity in both the formal and
informal sectors and conclude that each sector attracts the workers
best suited to that sector, that is, selection is the result of voluntary
choice.
The “exit” approach among the young may be explained as be-
ing the result of a transitory state. In the case of women, two factors
may increase the cost of formality: their frequent exits from the labor
market, which pushes down the probability of reaching the number
of contributions required for a pension, and the quest for ﬂexibility
(schedule, absences, etc.). It is worth noting that in an analysis of
the social security records, Bucheli, Forteza and Rossi (2006) ﬁnd that
the highly fragmented formal work of women seriously compromises
their access to pensions. Therefore, in a voluntary decision approach
the enforcement mechanisms would be less eﬀective than the redesign
of beneﬁts and costs. However, in the case of Uruguay, we may re-
member that the likelihood of women of being informal is not robust
among samples.
The voluntary decision of less-educated workers to opt for in-
formality depends mainly on whether they will thus increase present
income. Once again, the transitory (or non-transitory) nature of in-
formality is important. Note that Maloney (1999) reports that in
Mexico transitions are very frequent and formality and informality
are relatively well integrated. However, in the case of Uruguay, it is
worth noting that in the downturns at beginning of the 1980s and end
of the 1990s, unemployment increased especially among less-educated
workers. The same applies to informalityin the second of these down-
turns, (we do not have available information for the ﬁrst one). Thus,INFORMALITY SECTORAL SELECTION AND EARNINGS IN URUGUAY 303
we could accept the interpretation that there was an “escape” cause
followed by an “exit” cause.
We ﬁnd, using diﬀerent estimations and diﬀerent samples, that
formal wages are higher than informal wages. Estimations for several
Latin American countries yield diﬀerent results. Pratap and Quintin
(2003) do not ﬁnd evidence of a formal sector premium for Argentina.
Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla and Woodruﬀ (1997) ﬁnd a formal sector
premium for El Salvador and Peru but not for Mexico. Saavedra and
Chong (1999) ﬁnd that in Peru, formal wage earners are better oﬀ
than informal ones.
These diﬀerent results indicate that informality in Latin Amer-
ica may have diﬀerent explanations and the weight of each one would
vary among countries, as indicated by Perry et al. (2007). In the case
of positive gaps as in Uruguay, the “escape” approach seems to be ap-
propriate since there is no evidence that the costs of evaded contribu-
tions are shared. In any case, from the political economic perspective,
a positive gap casts doubt on the actual possibilities of enforcement
strengthening. In this sense, Forteza (2003) claimed that before the
reform, non-enforcement worked as an informal redistribution policy
and, hence, was quite popular, although the rules for compliance were
unclear. The challenge is how to design eﬀective formal policies.
6. Conclusions
In 2005, around 23% of salaried workers between 18 and 59 years old
were not covered by the social security system. This level of infor-
mality has been quite stable in the country in recent decades. The
phenomenon of informality is widespread in Latin America and there
have been many studies that, by evaluating the patterns of formal
versus informal-sector employment and the earnings gap among sec-
tors, examine whether it is the result of the presence of segmentation.
In this paper we explore the patterns of the personal characteristics of
informal workers and their jobs, and the extent to which their earn-
ings diﬀer from those of formal workers. Speciﬁcally, we analyze a
sample of salaried workers and sub-samples in the private sector.
The empirical results of the sectoral selection indicate that for-
mality is more likely among people who are better-educated, men,
residents in the capital city and heads of households. In addition, the
likelihood of being in the formal sector increases with household over-
crowding. Job and sector characteristics also impact on the likelihood
of being informal. Not surprisingly, informality is less widespread in304 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
activities in which the public sector is important in terms of produc-
tion volume. These broad patterns are similar among samples and
similar to those ones obtained in other studies in Latin American
countries. In order to evaluate the earnings gap between sectors, we
estimate ﬁve proxies that involve diﬀerent procedures. First, we es-
timate a wage equation for formal workers and another for informal
workers, and we use these to disaggregate the gap in line with the
traditional Oaxaca decomposition. We ﬁnd that after controlling by
skills and other characteristics, the average earnings of formal workers
are higher than those of informal workers for all the samples. Then
we look for a way to introduce the selection procedure underlying the
sectoral status of workers. Secondly, we estimate a switching regres-
sion model and three proxies of the formal-informal gap.
The results obtained through the joint estimation of sectoral se-
lection and earnings indicate that the gap estimation needs to take a
selection rule into account. The signs of the selection terms indicate
that informal workers are more successful in informality than a ran-
domly chosen worker. Although this result suggests that the decision
to work in the informal sector is a voluntary choice, the wage gaps
indicate that the advantage of informality does not depend on an in-
crease in present consumption. Indeed, the estimations that involve
a selection rule indicate that earnings are lower in the informal sector
than in the formal sector for all the samples.
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Annex 1. Estimated coeﬃcients of dummy industries in the
switching regression model: Selection equation (probability
of informality) and wage equation estimates
Selection Wage equations
equation Formal Informal
Mining -0.595 0.00873 -0.639
(0.564) (0.21) (0.64)
Food products -0.289 -0.0146 0.147**
and beverages (0.176) (0.040) (0.072)
Textiles -0.257 -0.176*** -0.334***
(0.196) (0.049) (0.097)
Wood/paper 0.299 -0.0214 0.115
(0.230) (0.076) (0.11)
Printing/ 0.295** 0.0894 0.203**
Furniture (0.145) (0.057) (0.093)
Chemicals and -0.163 0.178*** 0.0357
petroleum (0.152) (0.048) (0.099)
Machinery and -0.148 -0.0105 0.0729
equipment (0.110) (0.055) (0.11)
Electricity, -1.422*** 0.255*** 1.490**
gas and water (0.458) (0.056) (0.62)
Building 0.115 0.153*** 0.214***
(0.173) (0.042) (0.066)
Retail trade -0.127 -0.205*** 0.0151
(0.136) (0.036) (0.060)
Wholesale trade -0.172 0.0318 0.170**
(0.134) (0.043) (0.080)
Hotels and -0.030 -0.0585 0.226***
restaurants (0.161) (0.046) (0.078)
Transport -0.292*** -0.0429 0.0659
(0.109) (0.040) (0.081)
Post and telecom- -0.303** 0.132** -0.0631
munications (0.130) (0.054) (0.14)
Financial services -0.869*** 0.601*** 0.104
(0.158) (0.046) (0.23)
Services -0.218* -0.119*** 0.165**





Education -0.803*** 0.0719* 0.445***
(0.137) (0.038) (0.12)
Health -0.656*** -0.0165 0.0388
(0.084) (0.038) (0.091)
Personal 0.148 0.194*** 0.412***
services (0.110) (0.034) (0.059)
Others 0.805 -0.377 0.0900
(0.51) (0.32) (0.35)
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%;
**signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%.